© Universität Bielefeld
Center for Mathematical Economics
Published on
17. August 2016
Category
Lehre
Frank Riedel gives a talk at the Australian National University on „Ellsberg Games“, August 18 2016.
Frank Riedel gives a talk at the Australian National University on „Ellsberg Games“, August 18 2016.
Abstract We propose a framework for normal form games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In such Ellsberg games, ambiguity–averse players may render their actions objectively ambiguous by using devices such as Ellsberg urns, in addition to the standard mixed strategies. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two–person games with conflicting interests. These equilibria turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play. We also discuss extensions to dynamic games and a version of Harsanyi’s purification theorem if time permits.
Abstract We propose a framework for normal form games where players can use Knightian uncertainty strategically. In such Ellsberg games, ambiguity–averse players may render their actions objectively ambiguous by using devices such as Ellsberg urns, in addition to the standard mixed strategies. While Nash equilibria remain equilibria in the extended game, there arise new Ellsberg equilibria with distinct outcomes, as we illustrate by negotiation games with three players. We characterize Ellsberg equilibria in two–person games with conflicting interests. These equilibria turn out to be consistent with experimental deviations from Nash equilibrium play. We also discuss extensions to dynamic games and a version of Harsanyi’s purification theorem if time permits.