Transnational Influences, Migrant Identities, and Social Cohesion

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Transnational conflicts, belongings, and social interactions

Focus: Turkish postmigrants

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Summary

The present paper is an edited collection of manuscripts produced out of an online panel organized by the conveners on 1 December 2021 under the same title: Transnational conflicts, belongings, and social interactions. It was a part of the conference series promoting the 25th anniversary of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence (IKG) at Bielefeld University. Our call to bring together scientific knowledge from allied disciplines sharing the view that transnational bonds influence identity expressions, intergroup relations and the sense of belonging displayed by Turkish postmigrants has been echoed in the thoughts of our esteemed contributors. Their expertise helped us to better explicate the in-between position of Turkish postmigrants and their understanding of social cohesion in Germany and beyond.

The preface written by Andreas Zick invites us to think of the new global trend of ‘ethnocentric transnationalism’ that demands the populations living abroad to become ‘diasporas of the nation-states’ instead of feeling at home in their unique transnational space above and beyond a single nation-state. Deriving from the history of conflict and violence research, he postulates that increased networking capacities of humans and organizations also pose a threat to the spread of nationalist and exclusionary ideologies which are on the rise and conveyed across many extreme groups.

Bahar Baser and Ahmet Erdi Ozturk provides a brief history of recent diaspora currents originating from Turkey as a result of the democratic backsliding of the government in Turkey which is exclusively run by Justice and Development Party (acronymized AKP in Turkish) since 2002. Based on their ongoing study on ‘the new wave’ of migration after the Gezi protests, they show that official records fall short to capture the reality of the new wave since both legal and illegal ways of fleeing have been heavily exercised by dissidents of the government for a better life in Europe, eventually taking the form of a full-scale brain drain.

Aydin Bayad, Elif Sandal-Önal, and N. Ekrem Düzen aims to capture the reflection of the diaspora governance policy of Turkey across media outlets, seemingly taken as a straightforward strategy by the Turkish government to influence postmigrants’ everyday political stand. They show that, independent from the language of the media that formerly used to keep a division between migrants and non-migrants, the pursuit of political alliance takes priority in categorizing media sources as the location, language, and stakeholders of the nation-state have grown to be multi-branded due to transnationality. They propose three orientations among media sources that fuel political divergence between home and host states and depict transnational space in line with their political agenda rather than informed by postmigrants’ solicitations.

Finally, Besim Can Zırh presents a detailed analysis of voting behaviors of postmigrants as an outcome of the diaspora governance policies of Turkey. He showed that Turkey’s political and institutional activity to reach postmigrants in Europe is not a fruitless attempt; on the contrary, have a significant effect evident by an ever increasing turnout rate.

All contributions bringing this issue forth have been pointing out that there is a tension between official policies of the nation-states and transnationality of corporeal people whose experiences, demands, priority of belongings and expressions of identity are forming and formed by the transnational space. It seems that scholars had better focus on their agency, rather than on the nation-states, in order to understand the current and future conflicts as well as possible resolutions.
Transnationalistic Maneuvers – a Preface

*Andreas Zick*

The world is becoming more connected, more networked, more global, and more interdependent than ever before. ‘The national’ and nationalism are trying even harder to create, legitimize, and sustain themselves against the backdrop of the dissolution of borders. They are oriented towards national classifications of belonging, self-interest and self-reference, precisely in relation to their members, i.e., those who are the ‘nationals’. The confining "we the same" and the exclusionary "the others" is at the heart of the national guiding principle when it comes to the question of social and global order. When modern nationalism is viewed and criticized, it is often overlooked that modern nation-states and nationalisms do their delimitations and exclusions precisely in this context of global interdependencies, interdependencies, and interactions with other nations. What seems dissonant - nationalism and world community - generates the phenomena.

While national regimes are closing themselves off in their global interconnections and interdependencies, to the formation of new inclusive nationalisms and ethnocentrisms that seek to influence each other in ways that globalization strengthens, it is a simultaneous ‘counter-occurrence’ that characterizes the new transnationality and transnationalism. "We in the world" is a global project of nationalism that is intertwined and acts transnationally.

In this, the new transnational nationalism includes ethnocentric nations placing strict eyes on their own members in the nation and in the world outside the nation. They strive to be an authority and demand authoritarianism from their own accordingly. This is especially true for those members of society who travel across and between borders, are bound here and there, or form new homes elsewhere. Ethnocentric transnationalism demands that ‘their’ emigrants form diasporas, not homes. This is relevant because migration is an intrinsic element of global interconnections. It is a consequence as well as a defining element of globalization. Nations look to the "emigrated theirs," and since hegemony and dominance shape the motives of control of ethnocentric nations, the motive to exert foreign policy influence is particularly strong. From the point of view of the nation-states, transnational migration is thus characterized less by emigration than by migration of those who belong to foreign countries, at least from the point of view of the nations that want to determine who belongs.

The conflict constellations are thus, at the same time, more complex because affiliations and identities are not effortlessly stable but must be negotiated continuously, and the controls of control increase with the entanglements. It has taken a long time for the concept of "transnationality" to come into the view of social science research. It will still take time to understand the complex relationship between transnational conflicts, affiliations, ties, and social interactions.
For me, as the academic director of an institute for research on conflict and violence, it is all the more valuable to be able to provide space and time for research debates on conflicts, affiliations, and social interactions in transnational times. It is gratifying if the exchange is captured in the present edition for follow-up debates and further research. Even more gratifying if the debate contributes to what is engraved in our name, interdisciplinary conflict and violence studies.

And it is an outstanding honor when, at the Institute's 25th anniversary, researchers who come from, or live in, regions of risk and destructive conflict present their contributions or research them in their complexity. The authors in this volume represent this research culture and approach to research fields and topics that are politically heated. In trite words: Doing research in the areas of transnational conflict is not easy in some fields because research makes visible conflicts and violence that should remain hidden. This, too, is part of modern ethnocentric transnationalism; that would be my assumption.

The following contributions focus on migrant communities, diaspora politics, identity dynamics, and belongingness. These topics are partly new to the Institute's research and partly overlooked in historical retrospect. Conflictual diaspora politics have not been central to the IKG's 25-year research history. They came only with the postmigrant researchers who moved to our institute. They were overlooked because we ourselves had perhaps succumbed to simple social concepts of parallel societies and mono-directional integration processes that cannot adequately comprehend the interactions between the respectively different domestic processes.

The transnational view opens up understanding identity dynamics in communities that might have been consequences of interstate policies. The "case of Turkey," whose analyses inform this volume, is unique in its historical manifestations and identitarian phenomena. But it is also prototypical of the analytical triad of transnational influence, community formation, and conflict, a triad that is at the forefront of the analyses.

It is not uninteresting for the historiography of our institute, which is pending at the time of its 25th anniversary, what memories of research questions and topics as well as research foci should remain, and even more, what lesson we draw from research history and memory. Where do we come from and why do we now research transnationalism? Where do the contributions in this anniversary volume come from and why do we want to open up the debate even more in the future?

For a very brief history, the following observations might be interesting: In the 1990s, when the IKG was founded, intra-societal conflicts and violence phenomena shaped the beginning of conflict and violence research. German right-wing extremism and the violence of the 1990s, also religious fundamentalism, and especially disintegration phenomena shaped the view on conflict phenomena. The focus was on conflict and violence phenomena that arise within nations because these were fragile, as if broken at certain points, to put it casually. In the 2020s, among many other
topics, phenomena of radicalization into extremism particularly shaped the research; finally, a global phenomenon appears in terrorism that arises in countries, enters them as well as emanates from them. In this context, the topics of migration and globalization also became relevant, especially since the 2020s, as the recent past are characterized by borderless communication and mediatization of societies and their conflicts. Whereas satellite dishes had previously been pointed in various directions, the Internet and social networks connected people without any temporal or spatial boundaries.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the focus increasingly turned to transnational phenomena and transnationalism. Global populism, the networking of conflicts like violence shape local spatial as well as digital spaceless networked conflict and violence phenomena. The networked ideologization of the nationalism increases, too, precisely because identities must be generated again and again in the network. It is the new identity conflicts that drive nationalism because it has networked itself in such a way that new boundary markings must constantly be made. At the same time, new acculturation processes must constantly take place through the regeneration of transnational entanglements, treaties, agreements, and spaces, just as they must be controlled from a nationalist perspective.

The summarized focus topics, which reflect the research steps of our institute only in a broad outline, also include a new look at modern migrant communities. For a German institute, this naturally includes, in particular, the Turkish-German communities and the conflicts associated with them, in both constructive and destructive senses. It is justified and positive that the present volume deals with 'the transnational' and takes up the expertise in research on Turkey. The institute's move in 2016 to bring in researchers from Turkey and about Turkey and its relationship to the intra-societal dynamics of conflict here and to form a research focus was – to use grand words for the anniversary – historically, or less pathetically, exactly right, because the 2016 coup in Turkey has brought about a dramatic change in the European community and the order of nation-states.

The assumption that the coup remained an internal Turkish phenomenon with all its consequences was and is wrong. The coup and its antecedents should have been thought of transnationally, and the consequences have not yet been adequately researched in all their dimensions. It was followed by the formation of a new nation-state and regime with a religious, undemocratic, and almost monarchist face. It was followed by a reorganization of the balance of power. It was followed by a significant change in the relationship between 'the Turks here and there' and the others, most of whom are actually 'Us', let us think of those who cannot or do not like Turkish national identification. With the coup, a new history of national control and national influence began, which we find similar everywhere today. Power-oriented regimes under attack from within and without are ramping up their control paradigms, leaving the
world in uncertainty about what 'is to come'. And at the same time, they generate new cohesion among those who identify with them. Understanding these conflict dynamics in the case of Turkey helps to better understand other global conflicts. Even more, research with political, historical, sociological as well as socio-psychological understanding is required to unfold it. The concept of transnationalism offers the chance to study social change because it encompasses influences and conflict constellations at the same time. Transnationalism, in this sense, is the description of what has changed and forces us to understand the national elements in mutual processes of influence. At the same time – as the contributions make clear – it redirects the gaze to a postnationalism that turns authoritarian systems into social realities. Historical events intertwine. Europe always had the hope that the transnational community would succeed, but in the same period of the coup in Turkey, the European community disintegrated into more nationalist units than before. This also made the regime strong as well as authoritarian and infected others with it. New communities have emerged from the old ones, new identities and affiliations have been formed, and revanchist concepts of nationhood have experienced a romantic renaissance.

In 2021, the year in which these contributions followed a conference, the Federal Republic of Germany celebrated the 60th anniversary of the recruitment of guest workers from Turkey. The coincidence of the coup, memory of migration contracts, and new frictions in the European community order in the stream of transnational influences, identity dynamics, and conflicts opens yet another perspective for a new understanding of change processes. Remembering the 60th anniversary of the recruitment agreements, the phrase of the famous German literary figure Max Frisch from 1965 is tirelessly quoted in the political sphere: "We called for workers, and there came people." A sentence of tolerance and humanization, but also a well-meaning sentence. It overlooked the fact that people who were called upon were coming from communities, and forming communities. They brought identities, relationships between groups, homelands, and their conflicts, which are transnational bridges, like ships, like rivers. They generate what shapes and challenges modern societies: Coming to terms with the fact that, despite all nationalistic inclusions, influencing others does not come without openings. To understand this better, I recommend reflecting on the following chapters.
New Turkey’s Diasporic Constellations: A Snapshot of Current Dynamics

Bahar Baser, Ahmet Erdi Ozturk

Turkey has been going through a massive transformation under the reign of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Although the Party came to power with a promising agenda on reforms and democratization, the course of events evolved in another direction as the ruling party gained more and more power. Today’s Turkey has a new regime which is distancing itself daily from the main pillars of democracy such as human rights, rule of law, fair election and freedom of speech. Especially after the aborted coup attempt in 2016, there has been a massive crackdown on the opposition groups at home and abroad. More than 150,000 people were suspended and some 50,000 were jailed. Thousands of people who sympathized with the controversial Gülen Movement (GM) and others who were resisting the AKP rule in Turkey were sacked from their posts by emergency decrees, arrested or destined to a civil death situation. The political environment became severely unstable and insecure for those who are not loyal to the AKP and President Erdogan. The accumulated result of developments due to democratic backsliding is a growing trend in outward migration from Turkey.

The coup attempt can be accepted as a milestone for the acceleration of Turkey-originated migration to Europe, however it can be argued that the recent wave had already started after the Gezi protests in 2013 when many people in Turkey lost hope for further reforms and democratization in the country. Many white-collar workers, secular Turkish citizens, students and activists began leaving Turkey to start a life in the Global North and beyond due to their life-style choices and future considerations. After the coup attempt, however, most of the migration decisions taken by migrants and asylum seekers were involuntary or out of necessity because of fear of persecution, arrest and torture. Recent statistics show that under this gloomy political atmosphere in Turkey, many Turkish citizens, primarily the members of the GM as well as secular Turks, Kurds and Alevites, are fleeing or migrating to Greece – mostly as a transit destination – and to other European countries.

By the time we conducted our fieldwork, the data showed that thousands of Turkish citizens have applied for asylum in countries such as Greece, Germany and Sweden. The number of Turkish citizens who are granted protection status in European Union member countries rose by 300% between just 2016 and 2017 (Ahval News, 2018). About one third of these applications were ultimately successful. Apart from asylum applications in various countries in Europe, the United Kingdom was another popular destination for entrepreneurs and white-collar workers. The Ankara Agreement scheme (the “Turkish Businessperson” visa) has become even more attractive for those who want to start a new life outside Turkey. In 2018 there was a 6,000% increase in Ankara Agreement applications (Altunkaya, 2021).
When the dust is settled on the coup attempt and its immediate impact on Turkish migration, policymakers, academics and journalists started drawing our attention to the extent of migration from Turkey that goes beyond asylum seekers and exiles.

Recently, media outlets at home and abroad show interest in migration of Turkish citizens from specific sectors including medicine and software engineering, discussing the extend of brain drain from Turkey. For instance, as we mentioned in another report co-written with Dr. Hakki Tas from GIGA Institute Hamburg (Öztürk and Taş, 2022), “According to statistics released by the Turkish Medical Association 1,405 doctors (‘‘Turkish Doctor’’, 2022) left their jobs in Turkey to work abroad in 2021, and 197 more emigrated in January 2022 alone. That number is hard to swallow when compared with the previous years’ data. For instance, in 2012 only 59 specialist doctors left the country – a 2,206 percent increase in almost a decade (Inanc, 2021). Furthermore, the number of vocational language courses (Öztürk and Taş, 2022) for doctors, in German and English has increased rapidly in big cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, where Telegram groups have emerged to help each other apply for jobs abroad. The numbers are soaring despite the long, burdensome process of validating physician credentials in Europe” (Baser et al., 2022).

Combined with the asylum seekers, students and exiles, these numbers clearly indicate that the latest flow constitutes a significant wave of migration from Turkey, the largest since the 1990s when displaced and criminalized Kurds left the country in record numbers. There is a detectable brain drain from Turkey and this will have a significant impact on the country’s future. Moreover, exiles and asylum seekers from Turkey will continue to be a matter of debate between Turkey and the host countries. In the midst of these newly developing policies and politics, what can we say about the migrants’ own perceptions and their profiles?

With the aim of understanding the dynamics of this new wave of migration, we conducted interviews with 50 participants who left Turkey for a variety of reasons since the Gezi protests in 2013. Our fieldwork took place on-site and online between 2018 and 2022. Most of our respondents resided in Germany, France, Sweden and the UK. Our sample included the members of the GM, Kurds, Alevites as well as Turks from different ideological backgrounds and professions including journalism, engineering, academia, and law. The interviews were conducted as a combination of both authors’ separate research projects funded by the European Union and the Academy of Finland. We want to briefly share our preliminary findings in this short essay.

The interviews showed us that visa types do not explain the motivations for migration. One person may apply for the Ankara Agreement in the UK as an entrepreneur but the main reason behind migration could be fear of prosecution for political activities. One may come to Europe with a student visa but when there is a trial against them in Turkey, they may decide to apply for asylum. We immediately understood that this is a complex matter and statistics related to visa types will only give us partial
information about the profiles of the new wave migrants.
Secondly, we have observed that our participants exited Turkey by the help of a variety of methods. As mentioned widely in international and national media outlets, ‘illegal’ border crossings from the Turkey-Greece border were a common method especially for the GM members who used this strategy as a last resort. We were astonished to learn that it was very easy to find smugglers to facilitate such routes in Turkey. Some obtained fake passports and declared themselves to the authorities as soon as they landed to a European country. Others applied for business or tourist visas and overstayed in countries where they landed. There were also the ones left with a student visa and tried to prolong their stay with scholarships living in uncertainty and precarity. Apart from these migration decisions which might be temporary in case they are not granted asylum or secure residence permits, white collar Turkish citizens with higher education degrees started securing jobs in the Global North and left the country in large numbers thanks to the opportunities presented to them abroad. Moreover, some people turned to golden visa opportunities in Malta, Portugal and Greece to secure residence permits in the Schengen zone. Although countries in the Global North were preferred destinations for migration, some also moved to the Global South, for instance, to countries such as South Africa and Morocco. South Africa is a visa-free country for Turkish citizens and some find it easy to take the first plane to such destinations when they were compelled to leave immediately without any prior arrangements. Some of these people then applied for language courses there to extend their stay until they finally apply for asylum. There were others who went to the Philippines and tried to transit to Japan. We observed that people decided according to job opportunities, visa access or the easiness of applying for asylum. We have also identified that networks mattered immensely when people made migration decisions. Destination country was determined usually after finding friends or relatives who live there and who can help with adaptation for the first couple of months. Transnational linkages to diaspora organizations in the case of the GM and the Kurds mattered significantly when they decided where to go and how. Among our interviewees, there were many public figures such as Can Dündar and Hayko Bağdat who said that they made their decision about the destination country according to the levels of protection they might receive from those host states. One important finding we encountered was that many people in Turkey somehow obtained ‘just in case’ visas. They actually had a visa to enter a country in the Global North but they tried to digest the decision until they finally voluntarily decided to leave or until their situation compelled them to do so due to pressing reasons such as a pending trial outcome.
Another issue we inquired was about how migration decisions were taken by those who did not have to leave immediately. Our interviews revealed that everybody had a ‘different breaking point’. We asked our interviewees "What made you leave?" For some, the decision was taken after they lost their
jobs as a result of signing the Academics for Peace petition or prosecution as a result of political activities. Also, many people felt already disappointed with Turkish politics for a long time, especially after momentous events such as the Gezi protests or Suruç and Ankara bombings.

Some interviewees reflected on their decision and described their feelings as the following: "I need to go somewhere else. Keep the fight but do it somewhere else". For others, like Gülenists, for example, it was the 17-25th December events related to the corruption cases or the coup itself. Some women participants also mentioned that everyday sexual harassment and interventions into their lifestyles by the society and the political figures accelerated their decisions to leave. Every participant had a different account when it comes to the moment that they decided "I cannot live in this country anymore".

As the migration flows continue, newcomers are settling in their new countries of residence. Their adaptation strategies depend on a variety of factors including the opportunity structures in the host countries, their motivations to leave, economic status, education status as well as their future prospects beyond anything else. Some arrive to the destination country and immediately start long distance activism and mobilize with already existing diaspora groups while others retreat to their corner and keep a low profile to get used to the new conditions that they found themselves in. Our interviews revealed that return is not on the agenda for many. Especially those who came with their children are settling down in their new countries and admit that it would be hard to return as the ‘right time’ might never come. Others perceive their condition as exile and work towards finding ways to return when the conditions are ripe to do so.

How does Turkey’s political elite react to this exodus from Turkey?

Our observations revealed that the ruling party has played down the extent of migration from the country. There are not significant measures put forward to stop the brain drain or to answer the demands of different segments of society. At the societal level, however, the picture is quite different. A recent survey in June 2022 conducted by the Metropol Survey Company reveals that especially people who sympathise with the opposition parties think that brain drain is a problem for Turkey. Even more than %50 of the sympathisers of the ruling party responded that migration of professionals such as doctors and engineers constitute a problem for Turkey (see, Figure 1). However, political parties could not come up with a convincing plan which would prevent this wave of migration from continuing in the future just yet. The economic and political crisis which deepen day by day in Turkey may compel others to leave in the short run. Our observations revealed that those who could leave Turkey were just the tip of the iceberg and there are many others in Turkey who are contemplating on leaving but currently waiting for an opportunity or a trigger to take such a decision. This will have dire consequences for Turkey economically, socially, and politically; and this recent wave may also change the profile of the long-established Turkish diaspora abroad. Host state reactions to this newly emerging but substantial wave is developing cautiously but there is an awareness that many of the newcomers are there to stay.
Figure 1. Problematization of brain drain by political parties in Turkey (Source: Metropol)

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<td>For 75% it is a problem for Turkey that professionals such as doctors and engineers have moved abroad.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do you think it is a problem for Turkey that professionals such as doctors and engineers have moved abroad in recent years?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, it is</td>
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<td>75.0</td>
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How Diaspora Policies of Turkey are reflected in the Media: 
A Content Analysis

Aydin Bayad, Elif Sandal Önal, N. Ekrem Düzen

Diaspora making and shaping policies by nation-states have been steadily molding the transnational sphere alongside a facilitated human mobility, each of which enabling communities imagine themselves as part of the society either in the host, home, or both countries. Together with scientifically popular terms such as integration, diversity, and multiculturalism, the term social cohesion has emerged to denote the sense of ‘we’ness. Since this notion is mostly based on trust, willingness to help, and belonging (Chan et al., 2006; Schiefer and van der Noll, 2017), the minority perspective, especially in Western Europe, is yet to be understood. Although social cohesion is basically presented as a politically neutral concept, its vital elements of trust and belonging are closely related to the relationship between the communities and states. For the diasporic ones, this relationship extends to home and host states. Even though our focus in this paper is Turkish postmigrants living in Germany and the Turkish state’s diaspora policy targeting them, it is evident that attempts by nation-states to keep close contact and continue to interact with their citizens living in other countries are neither new nor unique to Turkey. As Zırh (2022) clearly states, "the concept of diaspora reappeared as an attractive coverage in the newly global system not only for the actors of media and mass culture but also for the nation-states with a significant number of citizens living outside of their national territories.” (p.24 of this issue).

In line with this tendency are the current trends of migration that may take on different facets depending on the attributes and goals of the migrants (Başer and Öztürk, 2022). Diasporic bonds, actual and potential alike, may serve both migrants (in their relocation) and states (in their outreach) in weaving the transnational space for their own purposes. In this sense, transnational space is prone to be affected significantly by national and international political strains (Zırh, 2022).

Expectedly, active diasporic policies would not go unechoed in the transnational space, which is already deterritorialized, but its inhabitants continue to keep ties with their country of origin more easily than ever (Özveren and Faist, 2017; Shklovski, 2011). As Sandal-Önal et al. (2021) outlined, Turkish postmigrants living in Germany are situated in an in-between existence. In addition, Zick (2022) pointed out that the understanding of postmigrants in Germany has long been squeezed into the notions of parallel societies or unidirectional integration policies. Accordingly, examining how postmigrants position themselves with regard to their being exposed to the diasporic policies of Turkey and the integration policies of Germany is crucial to understand the question of social cohesion in Germany from a minority perspective. Media, as a space to reach out the political discourses of both contexts, is
a useful means to examine the content and the dynamics of this perspective. Moving from this, our project *Transnationale Einflüsse, migrantische Identitäten und Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt* (TransMIGZ) initiated a detailed media analysis (Sandal-Önal et al., 2022; Bayad et al., 2022) as part of its aims to understand how Turkish postmigrants give meaning to social cohesion and position themselves in the society under these influences.

One branch of TransMIGZ media analysis investigates how Turkish postmigrants are addressed in two national contexts by scrutinizing the content of the most frequently followed media outlets in Turkish and German languages. Another branch of analysis, however, focuses on how diaspora politics is reflected in the media, assuming that the media is not a negligible source to account for opinion formation and thus meaning-making as well as positioning of postmigrants. As proposed by Kosnick (2003; 2020), ethnic media use was considered as an obstacle to integration (e.g., different sources and language of media followed by postmigrants). However, as digitalization gained momentum and altered the patterns of communication across borders, ethnic media production and consumption evolved into virtual communication, creating new ways to new spaces for diasporas (see Nedelcu, 2018). Although social media takes the lead here, digital news sources are also critical in distributing political discourses broadcasted by nation-states.

That is why, from a psychological point of view, we propose that media content followed by the postmigrants should also be categorized in relation to diaspora politics. In other words, examining particular items would not reveal the apprehension towards migrants and the questions associated with them as mirrored in the media. Instead, taking the media reflections of policies targeting postmigrants has the advantage of disclosing the way they were targeted by both home and host states.

Accordingly, we present a portion of data from our media screening study concerning (i) the way the Turkish state takes action to reach out to postmigrants with the aim of generating and shaping a ‘Turkish diaspora’ in Germany, (ii) the way media sources responding those outreach policies of Turkish state, and (iii) the way this action encountered a counteraction. In this way, we attempt to bring the most salient terms of this antithetic transaction to surface.

Corpus of data we present in this paper consist of 84 linguistic units reduced from 187 items (both news and opinion pieces) screened out of 83 digital media outlets publishing in English, German and Turkish. Our screening covered the years 2004 to 2021, expanding to 15 countries. Nearly 88% of media items are from four countries: Germany (50%), Turkey (28%), Austria (0.5 %), and USA (0.5 %), the rest being 0.2 % or lower. We inspected the content reported by media outlets independent of the language and source country in order to reveal the contested political discourses around the diaspora outreach of Turkey. Basically, we processed the digital media coverage since the current transnational space is highly digitalized (Shklovski, 2011; Duru, Favell and Varela, 2019). Since we use this preliminary data set as...
a springboard for our following studies on the same topic (Sandal-Önal et al., 2022; Bayad et al. 2022), here we restrict ourselves to present a content analysis of proposed media reflections via word frequencies derived from our screening.

We employed a Qualitative Content Analysis (Schreier, 2013) relying on a deductive approach in reference to diaspora governance literature revisited above that resulted in three clusters of the message, which are simultaneously complementary and contesting. We named these three clusters in accordance with their kernel orientation: Action, Response, and Counteraction. The cluster of Action (21 items, 25 %) summarizes the dominant political discourse of the home-state, mostly by Turkey affiliated media, targeting postmigrants in an attempt to generate and shape a state-fashioned Turkish diaspora in Germany. Items in the cluster of Response (26 items, 31 %) reflects how diasporic policies and activities of the home-state is received, interpreted, and reacted, albeit mostly by non-affiliated/independent media. The final cluster, Counteraction (37 items, 44 %), displays the disputes, as represented by the media messages opposing to Turkey’s outreach to postmigrants, this time mostly by host-state affiliated media.

**Action**

Across news and opinions intended to promote Turkey’s outreach, the very concept of ‘media’ plays a crucial role. As expected, mentions of Turkey and Turkish postmigrants in foreign media is a source of continuous resentment, eventually leading to challenge and criticize ‘Europe’ and thereby insinuating Western countries, governments, and policies (Öktem, 2014). Apparently, part of the reason is that the Turkish state addresses a certain fashion of postmigrant whose persona, rather than the person, is believed to be malleable by way of diasporic actions and discourses. In other words, the image of the postmigrant in the eye of the host state is a useful tool in the hands of the Turkish state to achieve a diaspora conforming to the official imagination.

These elements are implied by messages in this cluster are reminders of inflexibly negative ideations towards Turkey-origin people by reiterating postmigrants’ position of not being an elemental part of the society. This aspect is most visible through the terms participation, people, religion, and culture. Complimentarily, the term extreme-right such that it is seen as a source of threat to the Turkish postmigrants, who are mostly referred as Turks, workers, immigrants, and foreigners. However, it is worth noting that ‘Turks’ are more frequently mentioned than other terms denoting postmigrants.

In this way, action-oriented messages contribute to a double discourse of threat and nonrecognition toward postmigrants by the host state. Challenging Europe in general and Germany, in particular, finds its expression in claims to restore postmigrants’ respectfulness by reintroducing them with their homeland, community, and origin. More, the Turkish state articulates certain unresolved issues to be addressed by the German state, such as racism, discrimination, and citizenship. We argue that Turkish diaspora policy is carried out on the grounds of right-wing authoritarianism, stealing
the agency of postmigrants away, especially by endorsing families, youth, kids, and diaspora. It seems that the Turkish diaspora policies try to earn postmigrants’ esteem by reintroducing them their country of origin at the expense of losing their individual and collective agency.

Figure 1. Word cloud of media items collapsed into the Action cluster

Response

Overall variety of topics and terms in the cluster of Response may be interpreted as representing the fragmented structure of the postmigrant population more realistically (Kaya, 2019; Duru, Favell and Varela, 2019). Historical, social, and personal struggles of postmigrants constitute the central tendency of this cluster in which citizenship, naturalization, integration, community, organizations, language and society have been appearing from various perspectives and cases. Diaspora, too, comes to the forefront along with terms like social, political, people and language. This tendency shows the multiformity of the postmigrant population who stand fast for their diversification and thus agency in their response to diasporic attempts. In other words, response messages in this cluster offset the attempt to belittle the agency of the postmigrants by asserting a range of agencies that could not be overlooked.

Notwithstanding the eclectic connotation, the duality between the Turks and the Germans may be seen as a problematization of belonging and prioritization of participation contrary to right-wing threat surfaced in Action oriented messages (Bayad, 2021; Sauer, 2018). Here, postmigrants are seen as part of the society and daily life in the host state rather than a threat to it, despite underlined mentions of Grey Wolves and other right-extremist groups. The terms like German-Turkish, generation, education, schools, children, life, residence, and constitution add up to imply the importance of
pursuing a good life rather than being part of a preordained political agenda. Additionally, other ethnicities such as Kurds, surface in this cluster, adding to the understanding of heterogeneity towards postmigrant population.

Another point of divergence here is that instead of an official representation of the Turkish state, the president’s name (Erdoğan) shows up, possibly implying the way diasporic policies are associated with the most pronounced political figure rather than institutional structures. An indirect inference out of the dispersion of terms in this cluster would be that the Action by the Turkish state is homogeneous whereas the Response generated against it is heterogeneous.

**Figure 2.** Word cloud of media items collapsed into the Response cluster

**Counteraction**

In contrast, especially to the Response cluster, items in the Counteraction cluster depict the types and levels of concern in the face of the Turkish state’s diasporic policies. Persons and institutions actually or allegedly associated with or affiliated to the Turkish government, together with their nationalist allies are the center of attention here. Yet, similar to action-oriented messages, postmigrants’ perspectives are poorly represented. Worse, media messages in this cluster associate postmigrants with organizations which are officially or unofficially sponsored by the Turkish government, such as the Union of International Democrats (UID), DITIB, and other conservative-religious associations.

The highlight on Grey Wolves is no surprise in this portrait. It has been presumed that Grey Wolves and their activities are overlooked, if not endorsed, by the Turkish state (see, Hoffman et al., 2020). The similarity between the frequencies of Grey Wolves and the name Erdoğan (rather than his official title) along with other high-frequency terms like...
government, media, migrants and election make it easy to form the impression that the diasporic policies of Turkey is ambidextrous. For that reason, once counteraction messages drew attention to threats from the Turkish state, carrying this shadow onto Turkish postmigrants comes almost naturally. The mention of CDU with a high frequency is eye-catching and needs further examination to see if it is related to the extensive views of the central right on the postmigrants or, since AKP is mentioned as frequently, to the relationships between two governments.

In so doing, this cluster harbor the most politically-laden content by focusing on the political groups whose scope and influence across the postmigrant population are contested (Hiscott, 2005; Kaya, 2019; Ramm, 2010). It seems that, political aspects of diasporic policies of the Turkish state preoccupies the media remarkably more anxiously than social aspect of it. Hence, counteraction-oriented media messages draw attention to the operations (by the hands of Gray Wolves and other organizations and associations) of the Turkish state inside Germany. Therefore, Counteraction cluster reflects the activities by political actors that inevitably overshadows the agency of the postmigrants, this time mostly by host-state affiliated media sources.

Less frequent terms in this cluster support the view that Counteraction messages reflect an institutional opposition. These terms include acronyms or handles of German or Turkish organizations (official and unofficial alike) such as SPD, Greens, Left Party (at the German side) and TRT, MHP, Ottoman, SETA (at the Turkish side). It is not clear, in this picture, whether the overall implication by Counteraction messages amounts to the suggestion that the Turkish state should not interfere with the agencies of postmigrants in the host state or that the very same postmigrants should confer the limits granted by Germany, regardless of these limits endorse or undermine their agency.

Figure 3. Word cloud of media items collapsed into the Counteraction cluster

![Word Cloud Image]
In sum, our media screening shows that it is possible to trace diaspora policy of Turkey and its resonations across virtual transnational space which is more and more accessible to postmigrants (Öktem, 2014; Özveren and Faist, 2017; Shklovski, 2011). Besides, under highly politicized media landscape, messages conveyed by various agents (e.g., states and allies alike) targeting postmigrants go beyond the languages and create semantic and sentimental clusters. As such, the way these messages framed in their transmission may affect how postmigrants receive them and how it affects their understanding of social cohesion (Sandal-Önal et al., 2022).

In that sense, outreach efforts by both home and host states do not primarily serve the benefits of the postmigrants; rather, endorse politically-laden and skewed perspective of state standpoint, eventually eroding efforts towards social cohesion. They have the tendency of undermining the agency of postmigrants and taking them as a homogeneous group indicated by not mentioning other designations that they might like to adopt for themselves and that are socially more relevant.

References


When the Homeland Calls: Turkey's New Diaspora Making Strategy and the External Voting Right.

Besim Can Zırh

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002 following a devastating politico-economic crisis with promises to reform the country in the face of a history of military tutelage. In the two decades since 2002, the AKP has jumped through many hoops, such as the presidential election (by the Parliament) in 2007 and the “democratic initiative” process of 2009, during which the party’s persistence in continuing reforms was widely supported by liberal sectors of Turkish society as well as the European Union. However, the unexpected emergence of the Gezi Park protests (2013) following the Arab Spring (2011), during which Turkey had been presented as a role model for countries in the Middle East, led to the fading of the country’s rosy image. The sharp shift in portrayals of Turkey in the person of Erdoğan on the covers of international magazines illustrates this transition well. Since the Gezi protests, the first of their kind in the history of Turkey, the AKP government has been suffering a progressive loss of credibility at two main nexus points: On the domestic scene, a sharp U-turn in the democratization process, particularly relating to the Kurdish issue, tore down the initial strategy of becoming a full member of the EU. On the international scene, on the other hand, an unpredictable and unstable agenda in relation to the Syrian refugee influx and efforts to play an unpleasant gatekeeper role between Europe and the region shook the international community’s faith in Turkey. These two main nexus points began interpenetrating each other in the wake of the coup attempt of July 2016.

In this process, what was formerly thought of as belonging to the domain of domestic affairs became sharply internationalized and vice versa. For instance, on March 24, 2017, a group of Bulgarian nationalists erected a border fence to keep dual Bulgarian-Turkish citizens from voting in parliamentary elections in Bulgaria (DW, 2017b). According to their claims, a new party established in 2016 and named “Democrats for Unity, Solidarity and Tolerance,” the acronym of which means “friend” in Turkish, was actually being used by the AKP government to canalize the votes of approximately 200,000 ethnic Turks expatriated from Bulgaria in 1989 and living in Turkey while still holding Bulgarian passports, in an attempt to interfere in the domestic politics of the country. In the same period, the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policies, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, was detained at the border between Germany and the Netherlands by the Dutch authorities to prevent her addressing a rally organized by Turkish migrant organizations in Rotterdam in support of the upcoming presidential election in Turkey. Although Turkish authorities were warned in advance not to carry out this rally given the
upcoming general election in the Netherlands, the Turkish minister did not hesitate to escalate the situation and a group of Turkish citizens gathered at Turkey’s consulate in Rotterdam to protest (DW, 2017a).

While remaining aware of the fact that the official narration of Turkish nationhood can be challenged and reformulated in the context of migration, Turkish governments have always kept an eye on their nationals abroad since mass international migration began in the late 1960s. The Turkish-Islamic Union (DITIB), for instance, was established in 1984 as an extra-territorial branch of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Avci, 2007) to provide various social and religious services framed in accordance with the official narrative for Turkish nationals abroad. Instead of approaching migrant communities, each of which had already established its own familial and institutional transnational social spaces (Faist, 2000), the AKP government developed a new pro-active policy with regard to only security concerns so as to mobilize Turkish nationals abroad as a “diaspora” community (Aydın, 2014; Öktem, 2014).

For instance, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) organized the first Turkish Diaspora Forum in 2007, in which representatives of Turkish immigrant organizations in Europe also participated. The Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) was established under the Prime Ministry in 2010 and this institution initiated the Consultative Committee for Nationals Living Abroad in 2013, through which the representatives of the “Turkish diaspora” could be in direct contact with the Turkish government. The Yunus Emre Institute, popularly referred to as the “Turkish Goethe Institute,” was established in 2009 to promote these governmental initiatives through language and culture. Moreover, the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) was founded in 2004 in Germany, and some believe that this organization was initiated by the AKP as its unofficial branch overseas.

Finally, the AKP government introduced the right to vote (expat voting) for Turkish citizens living abroad in their places of residence in 2012 (Şahin-Mencütek and Erdoğan, 2015). This was a highly strategic decision to mobilize migrants still holding Turkish citizenship in Europe. Turkey’s electoral campaigns led to the significant politicization of immigrants from Turkey along homeland-oriented ethnic (Turkish / Kurdish), political (secular / conservative), and/or religious (Alevi / Sunni) fault lines as well as around the AKP’s international and domestic agendas. Therefore, this new diaspora policy began to be criticized for being “aggressive” and “increasingly driving a wedge between immigrant families and mainstream society” (Popp, 2013). This opportunity to vote in countries of settlement was formally introduced in 2014 and millions of votes were cast in each of the five elections since then, including two presidential (2014 and 2018) and three general elections (June and November 2015 and June 2018).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Numbers of External Voters</th>
<th>Valid Votes</th>
<th>Electoral Turnout %</th>
<th>Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,078,079</td>
<td>530,135</td>
<td>19.06%</td>
<td>Presidential Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,864,108</td>
<td>918,302</td>
<td>32.53%</td>
<td>General Election (June 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2,899,069</td>
<td>1,159,871</td>
<td>39.90%</td>
<td>General Election (November 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2,972,676</td>
<td>1,325,682</td>
<td>44.60%</td>
<td>Referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3,044,837</td>
<td>1,358,584</td>
<td>44.62%</td>
<td>Presidential Election and General Election (June 24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. External votes and electoral turnouts rates from 2014-2018

This new diaspora-making policy cannot be considered separately from the AKP’s foreign policy at large (Arkilic, 2021). Moreover, neither this tendency of a nation-state to reach out to its nationals abroad nor the domestic and international political tensions emerging around such policies are new or unique to Turkey. It is clear that the concept of diaspora has reappeared as an attractive cover in the new global system not only for actors of media and mass culture but also for nation-states with a significant number of citizens living outside of their national territories (Umpierrez de Reguero et al., 2021). Various forms of diaspora-making policies have gradually become common for different nation-states, perfectly epitomizing the deterritorialization of nations “in the sense [that] those persons who have emigrated and their descendants are defined as continuing to belong to the polity from which they originated” (Schiller and Fouron, 1998, p. 133). For instance, in their review of the situation with regard to the recognition of external voting, Sevi et al. (2020, p. 211) indicated that 76% of 112 countries have recognized this right as a strategy since 1990 (49% and 22% of which have done so since the years of 2000 and 2010, respectively) to strengthen socio-political ties with their citizens abroad.

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Concluding Remarks

Three studies collated in this issue converge on the idea that postmigrants have already outgrown the top-down integration policies and, for that matter, impertinent attitudes prevalent at all levels of state institutions, administrative divisions, and decision making mechanisms. Media, too, fall short of catching up with what is actually happening on the side of the ‘migrants’ whose lives are rooted in Germany for over half a century. As transnationality becomes a daily fact, postmigrants invent, discover and engender practices of paving their way even if they have to settle for less than they might have attained if inclusive policies would have been followed.

The existence of a vacuum that gave postmigrants a hard time as to where they belong, who they are, and with whom they should stand with has been made visible by Turkey’s recently introduced diasporic policies. The promise is to fill in these vacancies by presenting them their home country again with a reformulated identity and a redefined nation granting reciprocal loyalty.

The question how the call of the Turkish state is echoed among postmigrants remains to be answered meticulously. Apparently, the call for allegiance with Turkey is not intended for each and every postmigrant; instead, it is intended for an imagined profile that may or may not correspond to actual state of affairs. As homogenizing, its exclusionary ordinance makes it clear that large segments of postmigrants as well as the groups arrived at Germany during the last decade are seen either antagonistic or, at best, irrelevant. As Baser and Öztürk clearly demonstrated, the diversification among the new wave of arrivals is a strong enough evidence that Turkish state aspires to fashion its brand of diaspora and thus makes it more questionable that such an attempt is in the best interest of the entire postmigrant population.

Nevertheless, new diasporic policies of Turkey echoed ostensibly among postmigrants, as documented by Zırh, especially with advancements that enabled voting for elections in Turkey. Irrespective of the endpoint where support is channeled, it is obvious that postmigrants have been engaged with the state of affairs in Turkey, differently and intensively than ever.

Once again, it is transnationality that facilitates participation transnationally, even when there may not be a one to one match to participation in the host state and making another question to be studied by researchers. In the meantime, accelerated diasporic policies of Turkey further caused German integration policies to regard Turkish postmigrants, just like its counterpart, a homogeneous community. The media study by Bayad, Sandal-Önal, and Düzen does not only exemplify the use of transnational media in transmitting diasporic policies of a given nation state, it also enables tracing down how postmigrants are homogenized in line with political discourses of respective nation-states, each following its own nationalistic agenda as if transnationality has no effect in shaping social encounters, interactions and exchanges.
The evolution of the relations between Turkey and Germany since the beginning of the Labor Agreement in 1960 repeatedly exploited rather than consulted the real actors of the unidirectional migration without genuinely considering their actual positioning and priorities of belonging. Most research activity and the mainstream policymaking mechanism rarely considered postmigrants as an inseparable component of the entire society. As Zick (2022) summarized in the beginning of this issue, it is now time to understand the people who “brought identities, relationships between groups, homelands, and their conflicts” (p.8 of this issue) based on having guided and informed by the agents themselves rather than relying on overdue assumptions that were seldom, if ever, hold true.
Transnational Influences, Migrant Identities, and Social Cohesion

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